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High technology clusters research has been on the spotlight for more than a decade and 
considerable knowledge has been accumulated on the structure and behaviour of such regions. 
Yet, several factors have hindered researchers’ efforts to depict the finest recipes for 
reproducing the best results of some clusters in other regions. On one hand, the theoretical 
debate on industrial clusters tried mainly to seize and explain firms and industry 
agglomeration advantages based on the geographical proximity with other organisational or 
institutional actors. The lack of consensus on the nature and effects of spillovers generated 
inside a cluster has, for a long time, monopolized the attention of scholars. Hence, little 
attention has been invested on the understanding of the stages and mechanisms which 
underline a cluster development (yet, see Niosi and Banik, 2005; Braunenjelm and Feldman, 
2006). On the other hand, empirical research often co sisted of snapshots of the most 
successful clusters. Several scholars have pointed out the lack of a dynamic perspective in the 
studies on clusters. In order to overcome the limitations associated to the largely adopted 
static view, many authors claim that it is necessary to reorient the research and focus on the 
study of the creation and evolution of technological lusters (Barthlet and al, 2004; 
Braunenjelm and Feldman, 2006). Furthermore, by focusing predominantly on the cases of 
successful clusters, there is little understanding o  the issues regarding those clusters that 
failed or were unsuccessful (Doloreux and Bitard, 2005).  
We designed this research by trying to avoid some of these common pitfalls. The paper 
revisits the anchor tenant concept, which is considere  as one of the central elements involved 
in cluster formation and growth. The ad hoc definitio s, the somewhat informal or static 
analysis and the variety of contexts in which the concept of anchor tenant has been applied in 
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the clusters literature have lead to a certain degree of vagueness and confusion about the 
following questions: 1) What is an anchor tenant? 2) Who may be an Anchor tenant? 3) What 
is the role of an anchor tenant in the formation and growth of the cluster? 4) What happens to 
the cluster when its anchor tenant leaves/fails to generate the expected cluster externalities? 
How does the number of Anchor tenants in a cluster aff ct its viability?   
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on these questions. The research is based on a 
longitudinal study of the aircraft industry and embraces an evolutionary perspective on 
clusters formation and growth processes. The first section focuses on the definition and the 
role of anchor tenant and on the theoretical debate about its role as a generator of 
technological spillovers. The following section describes the methodological issues and 
assesses the results of our empirical research on te anchor tenant in aerospace clusters. The 
third section makes concluding remarks and states th  main implication of the study in terms 




Many studies confirm the thesis that geographical concentration of technological firms affects 
positively their innovativeness and economic performance. Agglomeration externalities, 
which explain such location advantages, are defined as benefits that firms derive from the 
geographical proximity to other economic actors. Even if the nature of the agglomeration 
externalities has been studied extensively, the mechanisms that generate these externalities 
have received less attention (Basant, 2002). The anchor tenant hypothesis focuses on the role 
that some specific and important economic actors such as large firms, universities, public 
laboratories and others, play by anchoring other actors and thereby, affecting the dynamics of 
clusters.  
2.1. The origin of the Anchor tenant concept 
Industrial cluster analysts have borrowed the concept of anchor tenant from the real estate 
body of literature. According to Agrawal and Cockburn (2003: 1229): “The classic anchor 
tenant is the large department store in a retail shopping centre that creates demand 
externalities for other shops. Large department store  with a recognized name generate mall 
traffic that indirectly increases the sales of lesser-known stores.” Brueckner (1993: 5) notes 
that “high traffic levels are a result of the spatial concentration of stores achieved by the 
center, which reduces the time cost of a multiple-stop hopping trip.”  
Land developers seem to agree that the presence of at least one anchor tenant is essential for 
the viability of a shopping mall. This presence has become a pre-requirement for the 
beginning of the project. The most common incentive in the developers’ efforts to lure an 
anchor tenant to a shopping center is lease price discrimination. The anchor tenant is offered 
substantial rent rebates while the other tenants pay higher prices (Benjamin and al, 1992; 
Pashigian and Gould, 1998). The shopping mall rental contracts are written to (i) efficiently 




price the net externality of each store and (ii) algn the incentives to induce optimal effort by 
the developer and each mall store according to the ext rnality of each store's effort (Gould et 
al. 2005: 411).  
Even if there is a consensus among real estate develop rs about the role of the anchor tenant, 
it is striking to find out the scarcity of theoretical and empirical investigation about the anchor 
tenant concept, and the nature of the overall externalities generated among the different 
tenants. The Anchor tenant is supposed to have the larg st externality-generating ability in the 
shopping mall, but the other tenants have a complementary role. They help multiple-stop 
shoppers find items they have on their shopping lists. In order to internalize the externalities 
among all the shopping-center tenants, the project d velopers must resolve a two stage 
problem by first, optimizing the combination of the various types of stores, whether they are 
anchor and tenants, and second, optimizing the combination of their size. This is a hard 
problem, because as several studies have indicated, th  possibility of defining the nature of 
the externalities in shopping centers and to quantify their strength and importance is very 
limited (Brueckner, 1993). As Konishi and Sandford (2003) point out, researchers have 
focused on the analysis of positive externalities from the collocation, while there is very little 
understanding of the negative externalities generated from the anchor tenant. These authors 
have shown that, in certain conditions, the anchor tenant presence may reduce the benefits of 
smaller stores from the collocation. They argue that relatively high product substitutability 
rates of the large and small stores will benefit the brand name store or the anchor tenant itself. 
Yet, empirical evidence on this issue is still scant. Furthermore, there is a flagrant lack of 
studies vis-à-vis the dynamics of the relationship between the anchor tenant and the shopping 
center. How does the relationship among the anchor tenant and the shopping center evolve?    
2.2 Anchor tenant definition 
The anchor tenant concept has been applied to cluster analysis in both a formal and informal 
way. In this context, which constitutes the majority of the cases, it is implicitly supposed that 
the anchor tenant is an important constituent contributing to the formation and the growth of 
industrial clusters (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003, Feldman 2003). The recent research on the 
genesis of high technology cluster show that the presence of a large firm, a university or a 
public laboratory has attracted, in the same location, other important organisationl or 
institutional actors related to that industry (Braunenjelm and Feldman, 2006). However, it has 
not been the primary purpose of these studies to develop an in-depth analysis on the 
characteristics and the role of the anchor tenant in industry and cluster evolution.  
There are only a few studies that examine, in an explicit way, the anchor tenant and therefore 
offer valuable input for a rigorous definition. Agrawal and Cockburn (2003: 1229) define an 
anchor tenant as a l rge, locally present firm that is: (1) heavily engaged in R&D in general 
and (2) has at least minor absorptive capacity in a particular technological area.  
Feldman (2003: 323) stresses also on the argument that a regional economy may benefit from 
the presence of large, technologically sophisticated entities that anchor local economies. 
According to the author, as part of an innovative infrastructure, a large established entity is 
central to the creation of an important volume of ideas and knowledge externalities which 




may benefit other firms, especially the start-up ones. According to Feldman, such entities may 
be large research universities. 
Link et al. (2003: 1219) identify high-technology anchor tenants as large R&D-intensive 
firms, as defined by their patenting activity, that have a strong focus on a particular 
technological field. They conjecture that high-technology anchor tenants enhance regional 
innovation systems by stimulating technological externalities through their own actions and 
by attracting firms (what the authors refer to as ‘co-location’) that also generate technological 
spillovers within the local region. 
Niosi and Zhegu (2005) have identified large aerospace firms as main anchor tenants in 
aircraft regional systems of innovation in Canada. These firms have most often started the 
cluster, and in a similar dynamics with shopping malls, other smaller firms agglomerated 
afterwards in the area. This paper develops the argument for the vast majority of aerospace 
clusters in the world. 
We define the anchor tenant as a central innovating organization in a high technology cluster 
which contributes to the enhancement of the advantages of co-location by generating an 
important volume of knowledge and technology spillovers through its own actions, and by 
attracting in the same location, other organizations. 
A set of questions arises regarding the relationship between the anchor tenant and the 
industrial cluster. On the one hand, there is the lack of theoretical and empirical evidence 
about the nature of the knowledge spillovers generated by the anchor tenant. On the other, 
there are no studies that take into consideration the evolution of the relationship between the 
anchor tenant and the cluster. What happens when an a chor tenant leaves or goes bankrupt? 
Several scenarios are possible:  
- The anchor tenant leaves/fails and employment in cluster declines; 
- The anchor tenant leaves/fails and the number of smaller tenants declines; 
- The anchor tenant leaves /fails and other anchors fill the space  
- The more the anchors there are in the cluster, th smaller the chances that the 
loss of one anchor has an impact on employment or small tenants 
3. Empirical Research:  
This paper identifies the role of the anchor tenants i  the creation and development of North 
American aircraft clusters. We have studied the evolution of these clusters throughout the 
industry lifetime.  
3.1 Sources of data and methodological issues 
In order to test the research hypothesis we have triangulated several sets of data about aircraft 
industry clusters and their regional technological and institutional infrastructure. 




Longitudinal series of data on aircraft industry employment, production and industrial 
dynamics such as, companies’ market shares, their market entry or exit, the number of 
acquisitions, mergers, and technology transfers or alliances, have been possible through the 
combination of data provided by governmental sources, (US Bureau of Census, Statistic 
Canada, Strategis), industrial associations (US Aerospace Industries Association, Aerospace 
Industry Association of Canada, CAMAQ), several aircraft industry specialised 
encyclopaedias or other publications (Jane’s All the World Aircraft, Mondey and Taylor 
(2000) The new illustrated encyclopaedia of Aircraft), companies’ information and business 
reports directories (Mergent, Hoover’s, Scott’s). 
The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database h  also been a main source of data 
for our research. Two factors have influenced this choice. One, the United States has 
dominated the innovative activity in the aerospace sector, and has generated the largest 
number of patents in this sector. Two, the American market constitutes the most conspicuous 
technological market in the world, which forces theinternational innovators to protect their 
inventions in this market. Therefore, the USPTO datab se shows that the most patented 
aircraft inventions are in this part of the world. We have extracted 40013 patents belonging to 
class 244 from this database. This class, according to the current classification of USPTO, 
regroups the patents corresponding to the technological domain 'Aeronautics and 
Astronautics'. In the majority of the cases, each patent lists several technological domains 
where the invention may be applied. Among the extracted patents we found some which have 
claimed simultaneously, up to 40 different technological domains. To avoid noises created by 
the presence of distant or secondary inventions with respect to the aircraft sector, we kept in 
our database only the patents which claim class 244 as the principal (first) technological 
domain for their invention. Some 26533 patents have satisfied this condition. From each 
patent we have collected information about the assignee(s) name and location, inventor(s) 
name and location, and the year in which the patent was officially issued by the USPTO. This 
information has allowed the mapping of aircraft industries’ patented invention in time and 
space. 
3.2 Anchor tenants, labour pools and the emergence of the aerospace clusters 
From its origin, the aircraft industry has revealed a persistent tendency to be concentrated 
geographically. The first focal areas appeared in the US northeast regions or in the so-called 
“the manufacturing belt”, which at the beginning of the twentieth century counted for around 
three quarters of the country’s industrial production (Perloff et al, 1965). The geographical 
location of the emerging aircraft industry has been highly independent from the markets of 
both its inputs and outputs. So, for instance, when the airplanes were made in a wooden 
structure, the forests of spruce trees were situated in the northwest regions, while the industry 
clustered on the northeast. Later on, when the metallic structure replaced the wooden one, the 
industry went away from the northeast regions which dominated the production of metal. 
Also, there are only a few isolated cases of companies which show that the proximity to their 
customer as a criteria for the choice of their operational sites. Such is the case of Glenn L. 
Martin Company, which was heavily dependent on governm nt military contracts, and 




therefore it transferred, in 1928, its installations from Cleveland, Ohio to Baltimore, 
Maryland. 
The first question is what anchored the emergent aircraft industry in the “manufacturing 
belt”? According to Cunningham (1951), during the first decades of the twentieth century, 90 
per cent of the job positions of the aircraft industry required employees endowed with a 
highly or more than the average qualification by standards at that time. Considering that the 
employees were supposed to accomplish multiple, non-sta dardised tasks, and resolve 
numerous unpredictable technical difficulties, the training of the workforce for the new 
industry would have been very long and expensive. In this context, the presence in the 
manufacturing belt of some formative industries attrac ed the infant aircraft industry to these 
regions. According to Todd and Simpson (1986), the presence in the northeast part of the US 
of several industries such as shipbuilding, railroad construction, automobile manufacturing 
and other mechanical engineering industries contributed to form on the one hand, a pool of 
potential entrepreneurs, and on the other hand, a considerable pool of qualified manpower 
capable of understanding the complexity and satisfying the requirements of the emerging 
industry. Furthermore, during the first decades of the aircraft industry’s existence, it 
frequently happened that companies from these formative sectors, acted as “incubators” by 
dedicating part of their activity to aircraft production. Afterwards, based on their performance, 
some of these incubators converted themselves entirely o aircraft production, while others 
returned to their previous activity, and closed or split their aircraft production department, 
which continued to develop in an independent way. In the majority of the cases, these spin-off 
companies pursued their development in proximity of their mother’s company site. So, 
Vickers was formerly operating in the shipbuilding and defence industries. Curtiss Aeroplane 
and Motor Company originated from the motorcycle industry while the Wright brothers built 
the first flying-machine prototype in their bicycle factory.   
However, the initial advantage of the “manufacturing belt” did not last long. At the beginning 
of the 1940s, almost half of aircraft firms had moved away from their original location 
(Cunningham, 1951). Three types of industrial migrat on underline the rapid change of the 
aircraft industry location. The first, and the most important one was the so-called “westward 
migration”. Since the beginning of the 1920s, numerous companies started moving from the 
“manufacturing belt” towards the “Sun Belt”, the region situated on the south coast of the 
Pacific. In 1920, Donald Douglas Sr. founded his own aircraft company based in Santa 
Monica, California. Douglas Aircraft became the principal anchor that attracted several other 
companies to the region. In 1935, Reuben Fleet of Cnsolidated Aircraft transferred its 
company from Buffalo to San Diego. In 1939, John Northr p chose Los Angeles for the its 
manufacturing plant. According to the US Census of Manufacturers, in 1925, among 44 large 
American companies only 4 were in California; in 1937, Los Angeles and San Diego were 
hosting 24 large aircraft companies. 
A second and minor industrial migration involved an intra-regional movement of firms going 
from big centers toward peripheral locations. This was the case of Grumman Aircraft, 
Brewster Aeronautical and Republic Aviation, who moved to the suburbs of New York. Piper 




Aircraft had also changed its site without leaving Pennsylvania. Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor 
Company moved its installation from Buffalo to Clifton, both in New Jersey.  
Historical factors forced a third wave of industrial relocation. During the Second World War 
conflict, the US government, as a security measure, st ongly encouraged the transfer of the 
aircraft production in regions situated at least 200 miles inside the borders. Consequently, on 
the eve of the victory, the aircraft industry was geo raphically scattered between several 
regions. From 1940 till 1944, the aircraft production share of the central regions of the United 
States went from 4 to 44, 7 per cent (Cunningham, 1951). 
The first set of factors that motivated the rapid relocation of the aircraft clusters is related to 
the specific requirements imposed by the growing industry. Both technical complexity and the 
size of the new airplanes kept on rising and forced aircraft producers to enlarge their factories. 
When aircraft manufacturers considered the competing sites for their relocation, they looked 
for places offering vast territories and adequate topographical characteristics, as well as 
weather conditions facilitating flight tests. The southwest American coast had all these 
conditions.  
A second set of economic and institutional factors seem to have driven aircraft firms toward 
the pacific coast. This region offered an abundant working force at lower costs compared to 
the “manufacturing belt”. In addition, a less unionized labour environment made the 
southwest region more attractive than the original location of the aircraft clusters. 
Furthermore, during the first decades of the industry’s existence, the geographical location of 
sources of capital often determined the choice locati n of the aircraft firms. On the one hand, 
the emerging industry was still too unstable, uncertain and ignored from the investors. On the 
other hand, the aircraft firms were, yet, relatively small in size and their reputation was 
restricted to a small geographical area. In these circumstances, the geographical proximity 
with the potential investors increased firms’ visiblity. So, the interest that oil industrialists 
from Kansas had shown for the new aircraft sector attracted Clyde Cessna to this region. He 
benefited from their support, and opened, in 1916, his workshop in Wichita. Walter Beech 
followed his example a few years later. Also, after s veral years of bank refusals for loans, 
Donald Douglas was able to open his own aircraft company after he obtained the financing of 
a California business angel who was fond of aviation.     
A third set of historical factors exerted a major influence in the aircraft industry development 
and its choice of location. The new industry emergence period coincided with the two World 
Wars, whose strategic military needs made it possible for the aircraft industry to require that 
the government have a strong involvement in the financing and supervision of the aircraft 
industry. The industry remained highly strategic and therefore under government influence, 
even after part of the firms’ activity was reorientd toward the civil sector.     
The first forty years, the location and relocation of the aircraft industry seems random at first 
sight. Yet, it is possible to identify certain patterns and distinguish the role of some actors, 
which seem to have been crucial to the cluster creation nd industry development, and which 
may be interpreted as anchor tenants. In the very bginning of the industry’s existence, firms 
from the formative industries anchored the new industry by incubating its future leaders. Also, 




by supplying a pool of potential entrepreneurs and qualified employees, these firms attracted 
other ones to the same location. As other studies have pointed out (Duranton and Puga, 2001; 
Heblich and al, 2008) the emerging industry beneficiated more from Jacobs externalities 
found mostly in diversified urban agglomerations and consisting in inter-industry spillovers. 
Furthermore, the private or public sources of capital a tracted and anchored aircraft firms in 
specific locations. Also, a small group of keen entr preneurs, in spite of the small size of their 
new firms, succeeded to attract other companies and encourage the creation of a regional, 
physical and institutional infrastructure. In 1917, Boeing Airplane Co. had only a 28-person 
payroll (including also pilots, carpenters, boat builders and seamstresses) (Boeing, 2008). 
Nevertheless, William Boeing was able to pay for the construction of a wind tunnel at the 
University of Washington so that it offered courses in aeronautics, and could attract some of 
the few US aeronautical engineers to Seattle. Donald Douglas, James McDonnell, James 
Kindelberger and Howard Hughes followed similar trajectories as Boeing by planting also the 
seeds of its subsequent great successes.  
 
3.3 Industry, anchor tenants and aircraft clusters dynamics 
After the Second World War, the aircraft industry became a cornerstone of the American 
economy. By the late 1960s, the industry represented 1.5 per cent of the GDP and 7.1 per cent 
of the country’s manufacturing exports. With a level of R-D close to 15 per cent of sales, the 
aircraft industry became by far, the most technologically intensive US industry. Yet, it was 
the victim of a highly cyclical demand, especially related to the volatility of the military 
demand. The industry underwent drastic downsizing and persistent consolidation processes on 
numerous occasions. Furthermore, since the mid-1970s, aircraft manufacturing was obliged to 
cope with the decentralization of the airline industry, the volatility of the civil market, the 
unpredictability of governmental financing and latey, the fierce competition from the 
European Airbus consortium.  
The concomitant effect of all these factors imposed the long and intensive process of major 
industrial reorganization. The industry consolidation persisted till the end of the 1990s, when 
Boeing became the only American major civil aircraft assembler while sharing with Lockheed 
Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics the military and space market.  
Since the mid-1970s, due to the decentralization of the airline industry, aircraft manufacturing 
was involved in a long and intensive process of reorganization. The concentration of the 
prime contractors’ activities on their core competences followed by the vertical disintegration 
of the supply chain, created a highly hierarchical industrial structure. This is often represented 
by a three level pyramid, with the aircraft construc ors on top, followed by the subsystem 
assembling companies, and lastly, at the base, the other supply chain companies. 
The industrial consolidation was also reflected in a concentrated geographical distribution of 
the industry. In the 1960s, 92 per cent of the after war aircraft industry was clustered around 
the remaining large firms in the six US states: California (40 per cent), Texas (14 per cent), 
Washington (12 per cent), New York (11 per cent), Maryland (8 per cent) and Kansas (8 per 




cent) (Patillo, 1998). The present geographical distribution of aircraft clusters represents the 
same tendency of high concentration around the remaining firms. According to the US Bureau 
of Census , 85 per cent of the industry is located in six metropolitan regions: Seattle-Tacoma-
Bellevue (Washington); Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa An  (California); Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington (Texas); Hartford (Connecticut); Boston-Cambridge-Quincy (Massachusetts); 
Cincinnati (Ohio).  
It is easer to identify the role and effect of the anchor tenant firms on the cluster development 
for the growth and maturity period of the aircraft industry. The consolidation of the industry 
and the reorganization of its supply chain have affcted the aircraft clusters by associating 
their dynamics with those of the large anchor firms. It is interesting to investigate what 
happened with the clusters when, following the persistent processes of fusions and the 
acquisitions, major aircraft companies disappeared or changed their place in the industrial 
hierarchy. With respect to this, it is possible to detect three types of situations. The first 
anchor tenant-cluster co-evolution pattern corresponds to the cases in which, when the anchor 
firm ceased its activity, the aerospace cluster also put an end to its aeronautical activities. In 
1987, when Fairchild Industries decided to completely quit the aircraft sector, this put an end 
to a fifty-nine year old aircraft cluster anchored by this firm in the area of Farmingdale, New 
Jersey. In 1986, in a context of a major reorganization, Lockheed Martin transferred its head 
office from Burbank to Calabasas, both in California. Two years later the company closed its 
installations of Burbank and by doing this put also an end to sixty years old aircraft 
production activities of this cluster (Pattillo, 1998). 
The second pattern regroups the cases when the anchor tenant merges or is bought by another 
firm, but the aircraft cluster remained active. In a few cases, the cluster preserved its place in 
the industrial hierarchy, as it happened after the fusion of McDonnell and Douglas which did 
not affect the work of their respective operating sites. Thus, the Long Beach cluster in 
California kept developing the DC-8 and DC-9 models ven if the new company’s 
headquarters were transferred in St-Louis, Missouri.  
However, in the majority of cases, by losing its anchor tenant, an aircraft cluster activity was 
relegated to the subcontracting level. Usually after a merger or acquisition, research and 
development activities were centralized at the new company center. This happened for 
instance, when Bombardier acquired the Lear Jet and Short Brothers and centralized all their 
R&D activity in Montreal.   
Finally, another pattern emerges in the cases where the anchor tenant changed its activity 
from the aircraft industry to another sector. This new company usually required a similar set 
of expertise as the former. The cluster continued on the same path as its anchor tenant. This 
happened, for example, with the aircraft cluster of El Segundo, in 1988, when Rockwell North 








3.4 The anchor tenant and the innovation activity of the aircraft clusters 
Our research hypotheses suggest that the presence of an anchor tenant firm in a region 
significantly affects the innovating activity of that region. This section shows evidence 
favouring this position.  
Who are the aircraft innovator clusters? We have colle ted and distributed, geographically, 
the aeronautical patents issued between 1905 and 2003. Only five clusters represent around 60 
per cent of the patenting activity: California (22 per cent); New York (13 per cent); 
Washington (8 per cent); Ohio (8 per cent) and New J rsey (5 per cent). Analysis shows that 
at the level of the metropolitan areas, there is also  high local concentration of the innovation 
activity as shown in table 1.    
The geography of aircraft industry innovation has gone through many changes. During the 
emergence period of the industry the northeast repres nted 75 per cent of the patenting 
activity. The New York area alone counted for 45 per c nt of the total number of patents 
issued between 1905 and 1944. However, since the end of the Second World War, California 
regions took the lead in industry innovation activity.  
In the table 2 the aircraft clusters are organized on the basis of their innovative performances. 
The first group includes the clusters whose innovating activity matured. The second group 
includes the regions whose innovation activity over the industry lifecycle declined. The third 
category includes the clusters whose innovating activity kept growing during the industry 
growth phase, and declined during the industry maturity period. New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Michigan lost their dominance in favour of California, Washington and 
Texas, while New Jersey, Connecticut and Maryland went through an innovation activity 
growth period, which declined during the maturity phase of the industry’s lifecycle. 
What explains the growth or decline of aircraft clusters? The reason suggested is that the 
presence in a region of an anchor tenant firm attracts other innovators working in the same or 
in related industries to this region. Who were the anchor tenant firms in the case of innovative 
aircraft clusters? Tables 3.1 to 3.6 illustrate the p nomenon of innovation anchoring in the 
aircraft clusters. Two types of anchor organizations emerged: large companies and the 
government laboratories. Thus, Douglas Aircraft, Curtiss Wright, Boeing or Goodyear and 
B.F. Goodrich became the anchor tenant, respectively, of the California, New York, Seattle 
and Ohio clusters. Elsewhere, it is the public labor tories that gave birth to some clusters, 
such as that of Connecticut or Texas. The last line of ach table represents the number of 
inventors that each cluster hosted in a particular decade. It is evident from these numbers that 
the dynamics of the innovators’ presence in a cluster coincide with the dynamics of the anchor 
tenant firm.  
The data contained in these tables show that the number of innovator firms has increased in 
the decade following the arrival of the anchor tenant. Thus, the presence since the 1928 of 
Douglas Aircraft Company attracted some 30 innovators  the California cluster during the 
decade that followed. After the entrance of Curtiss Wright Co., the number of innovator firms 
rose from 17 to 42. A similar situation occurred in the case of the Ohio cluster, where the 




presence of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. and of B.F. Goodrich Co. kept many other 
innovator firms anchored in that region. 
Furthermore, with the growth or the decline of the anchor firm innovation activity, the overall 
innovation activity of the aircraft clusters often headed in the same direction. In the case of all 
the aircraft clusters studied, the slowing down or the closing down of the innovation activity 
of the anchor tenant, has provoked the slowing down and the decline of the innovation 
activity of the cluster. Thus, the decline of Curtiss Wright signalled the beginning of the 
decline of New York aircraft cluster. Both the number of patents and innovators fell during 
the decades that followed. The same phenomenon is visible in the Connecticut cluster, where 
the reduction of the innovation activity of the public laboratories was followed by the decline 
of the number of innovating companies hosted in that region. The decade following Curtiss 
Wright closure, the number of innovator firms in the region fell from 20 to 4. 
The propensity to patent an aircraft cluster is positively connected to the number of its anchor 
firms. So, even if the Seattle cluster has been hosting the largest aircraft constructors in the 
world, the region falls behind California in terms of number of aircraft patents. If the presence 
of Boeing contributed to propel Seattle to second position, the decline of McDonnell Douglas 
did not involve the decline of the Californian system of innovation. The presence in the 
California clusters of other large innovator firms contributed to keeping the innovators 
anchored in that region. Thus a multi-anchor cluster has the opportunity to perform better than 
the one depending on a single anchor firm. 
 
4. A typology of the anchor tenant-cluster relationships   
The findings of this research are compatible with those of some recent studies which focused 
on the industrial clusters lifecycle. As Heblish et al (2008) point out, industrial regions 
evolution follow some regularities which, in many ways are linked to the Klepper’s industry 
lifecycle theory. Here we suggest that the anchor tenant role must also be considered in a 
dynamic industry lifecycle context. The analysis of the long-term role and effects of the 
anchor tenant for cluster creation and development bri gs to light several elements regarding 
the workings of this mechanism and the way in which it affects cluster dynamics. The 
conclusions and results of the research and the proposal of a typology of anchor tenant-cluster 
relationships are represented in table 4.   
There is no doubt that anchor tenant firms have had a crucial role in cluster dynamics during 
all of the aircraft industry lifecycle. However, both concepts of the anchor tenant and the 
cluster itself have evolved over the subsequent phases of the industry lifecycle. During the 
whole of the industry’s existence, it is possible to discern three types of aircraft clusters: the 
incubators, the hosts of the national champion, andthe international mega-centres. Path 
dependence and some historical accidents were the principal factors which attracted the 
aircraft industry to the northeast part of the United States, while presence of training 
industries in this region had the role of incubating the new industry. During the industry 
growth phase, the consolidation process that took place reinforced the geographical 




concentration of the industry, while a few clusters became the hosts of the national champion 
firms. This was the case of the California cluster which hosted MacDonald Douglas 
headquarters or Seattle, which hosted Boeing. During the maturity period, among other 
factors, the industry had to cope with a fervent inter ational competition and the declining of 
no-the domestic public financing. Only a few firms did succeed by creating a powerful 
interaction by means of both local and global industry factors, thereby, generating and 
benefiting from all types of domestic or international spillovers. The clusters hosting these 
firms became the leading centers of the world industry.  
The presence in a cluster of an anchor tenant firm attracted in the same region other 
companies from the same or related industrial sectors. Moreover, the growth or the decline of 
an anchor tenant firm has affected the performances of the cluster. Yet the role of the anchor 
tenants and the nature of the knowledge spillovers that they generate in the cluster have 
evolved over time. During the first phase of the industry lifecycle, inter-industry spillovers 
were more important for the emerging aircraft cluster. They consisted of both a pool of 
potential entrepreneurs and a qualified working force capable of coping with the technical 
complexity and unpredictability of the new industry. The formation of aircraft clusters is 
strongly related to the role of a few entrepreneurs. Other recent studies have concluded that 
their presence has been essential to the creation of the cluster (Feldman and Berkovitz, 2005; 
Dahl and al, 2005). During the growth and the maturity phase, aircraft clusters dynamics were 
progressively identified as those of large firms occupying the upstream levels of the industry’s 
value chain hierarchy. In some cases, large public research centers anchored the industry in 
certain locations. This means that, even in the aerospace industry, private firms are not the 
only type of anchor tenant. Agrawal and Cockburn (2003) and particularly Feldman (2003) 
insisted on the role of the research universities for the formation of biotechnology clusters 
while Feldman and Lowe (2008) evoke institutional factors that have anchored biotechnology 
cluster in Cambridge area. The local intra-industrial knowledge spillovers dominate during 
the growth phase, while the international spillovers rise steadily during the maturity stage. 
This combination of local and international spillovers is becoming a general tendency of 
industrial clusters (Bathelt et al, 2004). An in-depth analysis and empirical evidence of such 
knowledge spillovers is necessary to explore better th  positive effects of such spillover but 
also to consider their less studied negative side (Alcacer, 2007; Alcacer and Chung, 2006)  
Exploring the specificities that characterize the relationship between the anchor tenant firms 
and the industrial clusters during each phase of the industry lifecycle, may provide useful 
guidelines for public policies, whose aim is to facilitate the development of the existing 
clusters or to craft new ones. The analysis of the co- volution between industry, anchor tenant 
and cluster seems indispensable to the formulation of effective targeted public policies. 
Further research and analysis is required in relation o comparing these issues within the 
context of other high technology industries. This will offer a more complete portrait, and 
provide more precise and general conclusions regarding the workings of the anchoring 
mechanism and the nature of spillovers generated in those clusters.  
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Table 1 US Aircraft Patent distributed according to Census Metropolitan Areas, 1905-2004   
 Metropolitan Areas 
Share of each metropolitan area patents 
in its respective state   
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana 77% of California 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue 97% of Washington 
Baltimore-Towson 56% of Maryland 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington 96% of Minnesota 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island 70% of New York and New Jersey 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington 80% of Pennsylvania 























Table 2: Aircraft clusters long-term innovation performance 
Share of each State patents in the total 















Based on the 
cluster number of 
patents) 
1 CALIFORNIA 22 9 25 27 Growing  
2 WASHINGTON 8 3 4 15 Growing  
3 TEXAS 4 0 3 6 Growing  
4 VIRGINIA 3 0 2 4 Growing  
5 MASSACHUSETTS 2 1 2 3 Growing  
6 ARIZONA 2 0 1 4 Growing  
7 ALABAMA 2 0 1 3 Growing  
8 FLORIDA 1 0 1 2 Growing  
9 NEW YORK 13 43 11 4 Declining  
10 OHIO 8 12 8 5 Declining  
11 PENNSYLVANIE 5 4 6 3 Declining  
12 MICHIGAN 2 5 1 1 Declining  
13 NEW JERSEY 5 4 7 3 Growing then 
declining  
14 CONNECTICUT 5 4 6 4 Growing then 
declining  
15 MARYLAND 5 4 6 3 Growing then 
declining  
16 MINNESOTA 3 0 5 1 Growing then 










Table 3.1: Anchor tenant- cluster long- term relationship, California cluster 
PATENTS ISSUE YEAR 
ASSIGNEE NAME 1900-1909 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 TOTAL 
Share on the 
total number 
of patents 
1 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES     3 22 88 79 192 12,3 
2 LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION     27 70 83 9 189 12,  
3 NORTHROP CORPORATION    7 11 130 31 8 187 12,0 
4 NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION     14 68 88  170 10,9 
5 DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY, INC.   1 10 24 25 20  80 5,1 
6 RYAN AERONAUTICAL CO.     4 1 52 3 60 3,9 
7 MCDONNEL DOUGLAS CORPORATION       13 43 56 3,6 
8 GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION      4 36 8 48 3,1 
9 
CONSOLIDATED VULTEE AIRCRAFT CO. 
  3 30 10   43 2,8 
10 LEAR, INCORPORATED     3 5 15 17 40 2,6 
11 HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY     3 9 8 15 35 2,2 
12 HILLER AIRCRAFT COMPANY, INC.      5 17  22 1,4 
13 TRW INC.       11 11 22 1,4 
14 NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORP.       15 4 19 1,2 
15 THE BENDIX CORPORATION    2 3 3 3 3 14 0,9 
 TOTAL NUMBER OF PATENTS 1 11 24 49 146 395 665 266 1 557  
 Total number of innovator firms 1 9 7 30 29 42 101 46   




 Table 3.2: Anchor tenant- cluster long- term relationship, New York cluster 
Patents issue Year 








1 CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION 85 63 104 57 13   322 24,3 
2 SPERRY CO 4 11 42 38 96 32  223 16,8 
3 BELL AEROSPACE CORPORATION   5 36 27 22  90 6,8 
4 REPUBLIC AVIATION CORPORATION    23 31 1  55 4,2 
5 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 1 2 6 11 20 4 45 3,4 
6 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY   3 5 17 14 1 40 3,0 
7 THE BENDIX CORPORATION   2 1 14 7  24 1,8 
8 BURNELLI AIRCRAFT CORPORATION  10 13     23 1,7 
9 IRVING AIR CHUTE COMPANY, INC.  2 15 2 2   21 1,6 
10 FAIRCHILD INDUSTRIES  4 1 3  6 6 20 1,5 
11 SEVERSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION   15 2    17 1,3 
12 FRIEDER    4 12   16 1,2 
13 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION   14     14 1,1 
14 M. STEINTHAL & CO., INC.     1 12  13 1,0 
15 BREWSTER AERONAUTICAL CORPORATION   1 9    10 0,8 
 Total number of patents 118 167 315 243 285 171 25 1 324   




 Total number of innovator firms 17 42 54 48 40 40 13     
Table 3.3: Anchor tenant- cluster long- term relationship, Seattle cluster 
Patents issue Year 
Assignee name 1913-1922 1923-1932 1933-1942 1943-1952 1953-1962 1963-1972 1973-1982 TOTAL 
BOEING  3 14 23 19 87 63 39 248 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES    1   2 3 6 
NORTHROP CORPORATION      2 1  3 
POSITIVE FLIGHT CONTROL, INC.       2  2 
LEAR, INCORPORATED       2  2 
WATKINS APPLIANCE COMPANY, INC.   1      1 
U. S. AVIATION CORPORATION       1  1 
THE FOX COMPANY 1       1 
SUNDSTRAND CORPORATION       1  1 
STINSON AIRCRAFT CORPORATION        1 1 
SIRIUS CORPORATION    1     1 
ROBERTSON AIRCRAFT       1  1 
RESEARCH CORPORATION     1    1 
R. C. STRUBLE COMPANY, INC.   1      1 
JACK & HEINTZ PRECISION INDUSTRIES, INC.     1    1 
HARDMAN AEROSPACE       1  1 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION      1   1 




FAIRCHILD INDUSTRIES       1  1 
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION     1    1 
AIRWAYS PATENT CORPORATION   1      1 
AEROCAR, INC.      1   1 
AERITALIA        1 1 
Total number of patents 4 18 27 22 91 77 45 284 


















Table 3.4: Anchor tenant- cluster long- term relationship, Connecticut cluster 
Patents issue Year 








THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES    16 67 63 69 24 239 59,9 
KAMAN AIRCRAFT CORPORATION      4 37 2 43 10,8 
PIONEER AEROSPACE     14 5 4 1 24 6,0 
CHANCE VOUGHT CORPORATION    1  8   9 2,3 
SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION    8     8 2,0 
DOMAN HELICOPTERS, INC.      3 3  6 1,5 
EAST HARTFORD       6  6 1,5 
CAIRNS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY   2 2     4 1,0 
CHANDLER EVANS INC.       1 3 4 1,0 
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION    2 1    3 0,8 
GENERAL SCIENTIFIC PROJECTS, INC.      3   3 0,8 
Total number of patents 4 4 35 87 99 140 30 399   
Total number of innovator firms 4 2 11 8 15 20 4     
 
 






Table 3.5: Anchor tenant- cluster long- term relationship, Ohio cluster 
Patents issue Year 
Assignee name 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 






THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY 6 37 14 3 25 44 9 138 20,2 
B.F. GOODRICH COMPANY 5 2 5 40 13 10 3 78 11,4 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES    1 11 28 22 62 9,1 
CLEVELAND PNEUMATIC INDUSTRIES, INC   5 11 10 32  58 8,5 
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY      34 5 39 5,7 
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION  1  11 26   38 5,6 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION     2 29  31 4,5 
DAYTON-WRIGHT COMPANY  25      25 3,7 
THE BENDIX CORPORATION   9 7   2 18 2,6 
GLENN L. MARTIN COMPANY  4 10     14 2,0 
THOMPSON PRODUCTS, INC.    1 6 7  14 2,0 
ZEPPELIN-WERKE LINDAU, GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTE. 13      13 1,9 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION    2 7 1  10 1,5 
WACO AIRCRAFT COMPANY     4 5 1     10 1,5 




Total number of patents 15 96 60 115 125 220 52 683  
Total number of innovator firms 4 19 18 25 23 30 15     
 
Table 3.6: Anchor tenant- cluster long- term relationship, Texas cluster 
 
Patents issue Year 
Assignee name 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 160- 969 1970-1979 
Total  number 
of patents 
Share on the 
total number 
of patents 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES     1 9 33 8 51 28,0 
CHANCE VOUGHT CORPORATION      13 13  26 14,3 
BELL AEROSPACE CORPORATION      6 11 4 21 11,5 
LTV AEROSPACE CORPORATION       6 7 13 7,1 
TEXTRON INC.        11 11 6,0 
CONSOLIDATED VULTEE AIRCRAFT CORPORATION     4 3   7 3,8 
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION       4 3 7 3,8 
GAYLA INDUSTRIES        6 6 3,3 
THE DOW CHEMICAL       4 1 5 2,7 
VLM CORPORATION        5 5 2,7 
TEMCO ELECTRONICS & MISSILES COMPANY       4  4 2,2 
IRVING AIR CHUTE COMPANY, INC.    3     3 1,6 
BOEING       1 1  2 1,1 




Total number of patents 3 1 3 6 32 86 51 182   
Total number of innovator firms 3 1 1 3 5 16 14     
 




Table 4: Typologies of anchor tenant, industrial clusters and Knowledge spillovers 
 
Archetypes of regions 
 
 
Typology of anchors 
 
Type of knowledge 
spillovers 
 
Industry life cycle 
INCUBATOR 
(Ex. New York, Paris, 













NATIONAL CHAMPION  
HOSTING REGION 
 (Ex. Seattle, Montreal,  





















Local and global 
externalities 
 
Maturity phase 
